paradigmas

25 juillet, 2006

panorama del movimiento hizbollah

Classé sous encrucijadas,estrategias — paradygmes @ 8:20

presentación

 

El siguiente recuento informativo sobre el movimiento de resistencia islámica Hizbollah, uno de los dos principales contendores de la actual guerra en el Líbano, junto con Tsahal, aparece en el sitio web www.globalsecurity.org/military.

« Hizballah is an Islamic movement founded after the Israeli military seizure of Lebanon in 1982, which resulted in the formation of Islamic resistance units committed to the liberation of the occupied territories and the ejection of Israeli forces. Hizbollah was established in 1982 during the Lebanon War when a group of Lebanese Shi’ite Muslims declared themselves to be the « Party of God » (Hizb Allah, which is clear in Hizbollah but progressively less so in Hizbollah / Hizbullah / Hezbollah). Upon the realization that the IDF was entrenching itself in south Lebanon, and influenced and assisted by 1,500 Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon, Hizballah cells began developing with the immediate desire to resist the Israeli invasion. Hizbollah began establishing its base in Lebanon in 1982 and has expanded and strengthened ever since, primarily due to its wave of suicide bombings and foreign support by Iran and Syria.

Description

Formed in 1982 in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, this Lebanon-based radical Shia group takes its ideological inspiration from the Iranian revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The Majlis al-Shura, or Consultative Council, is the group’s highest governing body and is led by Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah. Hizballah is dedicated to liberating Jerusalem and eliminating Israel, and has formally advocated ultimate establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon. Nonetheless, Hizballah has actively participated in Lebanon’s political system since 1992. This radical Shia is dedicated to creation of Iranian-style Islamic republic in Lebanon and removal of all non-Islamic influences from area. It is strongly anti-Western and anti-Israeli.

A very important factor that developed Hizballah was the establishment of the Islamic Revolution in Iran that was led by the Imam Khomeini. This revolution consolidated new concepts in the field of Islamic thought mainly the concept of Willayat Al-Faqih. The revolution also generalized Islamic expressions against the west such as arrogance, the great Satan, hypocrites and the oppressed. Due to that it was only normal for the ideological doctrine in Iran to take root in Lebanon. This tie was very quickly translated on the ground by direct support from the Islamic Republic of Iran through its revolutionary guards and then to Hizballah that was resisting the Israeli occupation. This religious and ideological tie between Hizballah and Iran following the revolution with its stance towards the Zionist entity had a great effect on releasing vital material and moral support to Hizballah. Hizballah’s ideological ideals sees no legitimacy for the existence of Israel, a matter that elevates the contradictions to the level of existence. And the conflict becomes one of legitimacy that is based on religious ideals. The seed of resistance is also deep in the ideological beliefs of Hizballah, a belief that found its way for expression against the occupation of Lebanon.

 Activities

Once established as a militia, Hizbollah received acclaim and legitimacy in Lebanon and throughout the Muslim world by fighting against IDF and SLA troops. In fact, since 1988 Hizbollah replaced Amal (the other prominent Shi’ite organization in Lebanon) as the predominant force due to its activity against Israel. Over the years Hizbollah military operations have grown to include attacking IDF and SLA outposts, ambushing convoys, laying explosive devices booby-trapping cars, and launching long range mortar shells and Katyusha rockets at IDF outposts and into Israel proper.

Between the spring of 1983 to the summer of 1985 the Hizballah launched an unprecedented wave of suicide bombings which included an attack on the US embassy and at a US Marine base in Beirut. Known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-US terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombing of the US Embassy and US Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 and the US Embassy Annex in Beirut in September 1984. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping and detention of US and other Western hostages in Lebanon. The group also attacked the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992.

On 07 February 2000 Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ehud Barak ordered the IDF to act, in accordance with the decisions of the Political-Security Cabinet, against terrorist and Lebanese infrastructure targets. The Political-Security Cabinet’s decisions were in response to the serious escalation in Hizballah operations against the IDF and SLA, operations which are based in Lebanese villages – a violation of the « Grapes of Wrath » understandings. These operations were being neither prevented by the Lebanese government nor restrained by Syria.

The organization was very active against Israel during its stay in Lebanese territory, and since the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 it began focusing on increasing and expanding its activities within Israel with the aim of carrying out « quality » attacks in Israeli territory, thus disrupting any attempt at dialogue and any opportunity to return to the peace process. This became evident during earlier attempts to hold negotiations with regard to a ‘hudna’ (ceasefire), when Hizballah operators encouraged attacks aimed at causing these contacts to fail.

On Saturday morning, 7 October 2000, an armed and frenzied mob, numbering in the hundreds, attacked the border fence from Lebanese territory, immediately followed by heavy shelling of Israeli border positions by Hizballah terrorist elements from Lebanese territory, using explosives, rocket-propelled grenades, Sager missiles and border shells. During the course of this aggression, three Israeli soldiers were kidnapped by a Hizballah unit which had entered Israeli territory for this purpose.

The organization operates against Israel in four main ways:

Bringing terrorists and collaborators through the border crossings using foreign documents
Setting up a terrorist organization inside Israel and in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip
Cross-border operations – smuggling weapons and terrorists
Financial support for Palestinian organizations and groups.
Since 2003 it has been possible to see a trend of increasing cooperation between Hizballah in Lebanon and operational entities among the other Palestinian terrorist organizations, with the accent on Tanzim, Islamic Jihad, Hamas and the Popular Front. This cooperation is particularly evident between Hizballah and the Tanzim and in practice, in recent months Hizballah has served as a kind of « external command » for most of the Tanzim organizations in the territories.

Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizballah, admitted for the first time in public the existence of a Hizballah unit responsible for activities with the Palestinians. He said this on Almanar television on July 19, 2004, after the death of Ghaleb Awaleh, a senior Hizballah terrorist: « … the fallen Ghaleb Awaleh is like the fallen Ali Salah, from the group which dedicated its life in recent years to helping our brothers in conquered Palestine. We do not wish to conceal the truth. We declare it and glory in it. Ghaleb Awaleh today has fallen on the Palestine road. He is a Jerusalem martyr. He is an Al Aksa Mosque martyr. He is a martyr in the fight against the Zionist enterprise… and we will not to abandon this fight and have never abandoned it. We are in a position where we will fight openly and we will fight clandestinely. »

Hizballah’s methods of controlling terrorist organizations in the territories are similar to those characteristic of the involvement of the command centers of Palestinian terrorist organizations abroad (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) in the actions of their organizations inside the country. Striking in this framework are the instructions to carry out mass murder attacks within Israeli territory, mediation between terrorists at the different centers of action, the large-scale transfer of money, and finally, coordination of the effort to upgrade the terrorist capabilities of the organizations.

The most significant remaining armed group in Lebanon is Hizballah, which the Government refers to, not as a Lebanese militia, but as a “national resistance group”. Hizballah seeks to defend Lebanon from Israel and the removal of Israeli forces from Lebanese soil, namely, the Shab’a farms. Lebanon maintains that the Shab’a farms are Lebanese territory, not Syrian. In the Secretary-General’s report of 16 June 2000, however, he confirmed that Israel has fulfilled the requirements of Security Council resolutions 425 and 426 to “withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory”. The Council endorsed that conclusion on 18 June 2000 in a presidential statement. Notwithstanding the Lebanese Government’s position that the Shab’a farms area lies within Lebanon, the Government has confirmed that it would respect the Blue Line as identified by the United Nations. The Council has called on Lebanon to respect fully its line.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 (02 September 2004) called for the « disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias ». The Government of Lebanon is responsible for the disbanding and disarming of the militias, including Hizballah, and preventing the flow of armaments and other military equipment to the militias, including Hizballah, from Syria, Iran, and other external sources. Lebanon basically rejected Resolution 1559, and by early 2005 this presented the risk of Israeli retaliation against vital Lebanese infrastructure to force action to disarm Hizballah.

A heavy exchange of fire between Hizbollah and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) across the Blue Line took place on 21 November 2005, surpassing any activity level since Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000. The exchange began with heavy Hizbollah mortar and rocket fire from a number of locations against several IDF positions close to the Blue Line in the eastern sector of the UNIFIL area of operation. Simultaneously, a large group of Hizbollah fighters infiltrated Ghajar village and launched an assault on the Mayor’s office and the IDF position inside the village, south of the Blue Line, which was vacant at the time. The ensuing Israeli retaliation was heavy and included aerial bombing. The exchange of fire subsequently spread all along the Blue Line and lasted for over nine hours. Around 800 artillery, tank and mortar rounds and rockets were exchanged. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) dropped at least 30 aerial bombs.

In a written report to the Security Council 18 April 2006, Secretary-General Kofi Annan called on Syria and Iran to stop interfering in Lebanon. The report, which was written by the secretary-general’s special envoy Terje Roed-Larsen, said that Hizballah, the Lebanese militant group, « maintains close ties, with frequent contacts and regular communication » with Syria and Iran.

Resolution 1680 (2006), adopted by the Security Council on 17 May 2006, welcomed the decision of the Lebanese national dialogue to disarm Palestinian militias outside refugee camps within six months, supports its implementation and calls for further efforts to disband and disarm all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and to restore fully the Lebanese Government’s control over all Lebanese territory.

On July 12, 2006 members of Hizballah infiltrated the Lebanese-Israeli border near Shtula, an Israeli farming village, and claimed responsibility for an ambush conducted on two Israeli Army Hummvees. The attack resulted in the capture of two Israeli soldiers and the deaths of three others. Five more Israeli soldiers were killed in the ensuing pursuit of Hizballah members into Lebanese territory. The combined capture of two soldiers and the deaths of 8 others; was considered the worst loss for Israeli military forces in more than four years. Hizballah also claimed responsibility for two separate Katyusha rocket attacks on Israeli towns resulting in the death of 1 civilian and the injury of 25 others.

The kidnapping of Israeli troops by Hizballah came in the wake of a similar incident less than a month before, on June 25th, 2006, when Palestinian militants forcibly captured an Israeli soldier to use as leverage for bargaining with the Israeli government. The last time Hizballah carried out a similar operation against Israel was in October of 2000, when 3 Israeli soldiers were abducted by the Lebanese militants. All three victims died either by execution or wounds sustained during their capture. Their bodies were returned to Israel in exchange for the release of several Arab prisoners.

The 12 July 2006 attack resulted in immediate retaliation by the Israeli military, which responded to the hostilities against their troops and citizens by bombing roads, bridges, and power plants inside Lebanon. The specific targeting of al-Manar, the Hizballah controlled television station, and the Lebanese international airport as well as the blockading of Lebanon’s sea ports was an attempt to force the return of the captured Israeli troops and place greater pressure on Hizballah. These retaliatory actions by Israel resulted in the deaths of dozens of Lebanese civilians and threats of further rocket attacks by Hizballah.

Strength

The State Department’s 1993 report on international terrorism lists Hizbollah’s “strength” at several thousand. Hizbollah sources assert that the organization has about 5,000-10,000 fighters. Other sources report that Hizbollah’s militia consists of a core of about 300-400 fighters, which can be expanded to up to 3,000 within several hours if a battle with Israel develops. These reserves presumably are called in from Hizbollah strongholds in Lebanon, including the Bekaa Valley and Beirut’s southern suburbs. The number of members involved in combat activity in southern Lebanon is under 1,000. But it has many activists and moral supporters. After the Israeli withdrawal Hizballah reduced the number of full time fighters to about 500, though estimates range from 300 to 1,200. There are also several thousand reserves, but these lack training or experience. Hizbollah’s militia is a light force, equipped with small arms, such as automatic rifles, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and Katyusha rockets, which it occasionally has fired on towns in northern Israel. Hizbollah forces are shown on television conducting military parades in Beirut, which often include tanks and armored personnel carriers that may have been captured from the Lebanese army or purchased from Palestinian guerrillas or other sources.

Location/Area of Operation

Operates in the Al Biqa’ (Bekaa Valley), the southern suburbs of Beirut, and southern Lebanon. Has established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and elsewhere. Its training bases are mostly in the previously Syrian-controlled Biqa Valley, and its headquarters and offices are in southern Beirut and in Ba’albek.

External Aid

Hizballah was established by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards who came to Lebanon during the 1982 « Peace for Galilee » war, as part of the policy of exporting the Islamic revolution. It receives substantial amounts of financial, training, weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic, and organizational aid from Iran and Syria. Published reports that Iran provides hundreds million dollars of aid annually are probably exaggerated. Iran probably provides financial assistance and military assistance worth about $25-50 million.

Hizballah is closely allied with, and often directed by, Iran but has the capability and willingness to act independently. Closely allied with, and often directed by Iran, it may have conducted operations that were not approved by Tehran. Though Hizballah does not share the Syrian regime’s secular orientation, the group has been a strong ally in helping Syria advance its political objectives in the region.

The “Martyr’s Charity” (Bonyad-e Shahid) supplied charitable funds for the families of suicide bombers. In 2001, Paraguayan police searched the home of Hizballah operative Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad in the the Tri-Border Area where Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay meet. Police found receipts from the Martyr’s Organization totaling more than $3.5 million for donations Fayad sent, though authorities believed Fayad had sent over $50 million to Hizballah since 1995.

Besides operating a worldwide network of fundraisers, funds are also raised through so-called ‘charity funds.’ Some of these are extremist Islamic institutions that, while not directly connected to Hizballah, support it, albeit marginally, in view of their radical Islamic orientation. While some of these funds undoubtedly pay for Hizballah’s military and terrorist operations, other funds enable the group to provide its members with day jobs, to drape itself in a veil of legitimacy, and to build grassroots support among not only Shi’a, but also Sunni and Christian Lebanese. In March 2005, Hizballah organized a large demonstration to protest American and other international pressure on Syria to completely withdraw from Lebanon. Syria did subsequently withdraw its military and intelligence forces. The Syrian withdrawal may have left a vacuum for Iran to expand its influence in Lebanon and on Hizballah.

In Israel’s view, Hizballah’s activities are part of Iran’s overall policy with regard to Israel, which is to fan the flames of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and initiate terrorist activities against Israel, despite the fact that Hizballah is a Lebanese organization consisting entirely of terrorists from Lebanon, with no national connection to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In view of Iran’s interest in smudging its fingerprints with regard to direct control over internal terrorist activities, Hizballah’s status is significant as Iran’s front-line operative arm against Israel. »

otras fuentes sobre el actual conflicto en el Líbano

El portal www.globalsecurity.org ofrece información detallada sobre el potencial de los actores en pugna en este conflicto.  La principal fuente de Hizbollah en acción, es la página www.moqawama.net, donde se publican los comunicados diarios que emite la Resistencia Islámica en el Líbano.  A su vez, el sitio oficial de Tsahal, las Fuerzas Armadas de Israel es  http://www1.idf.il donde se encuentran recuentos históricos sobre los distintos conflictos en los que ha intervenido y completas referencias sobre la doctrina de empleo de las fuerzas.   El periódico israelí Yediot Ahoronot, presenta en su página web www.ynetnews.com una visión completa y diferente de los acontecimientos vistos desde la perspectiva israelí. 

21 juillet, 2006

la cambiante naturaleza del conflicto en un mundo incierto

Classé sous estrategias,problematica contemporánea — paradygmes @ 6:15

prólogo

El mundo en los inicios del siglo XXI se percibe hoy convulsionado, caótico e impredecible.  Si hay un rasgo que parece distinguir al mundo de hoy es su carácter esencialmente impredecible.Efectivamente, la proliferación de conflictos de distinto orden en distintas regiones del orbe, denotan la existencia de profundas controversias de intereses que no fueron resueltas durante el siglo XX y que constituyen su herencia más negativa.   El hambre, el SIDA, la pobreza, las diferencias religiosas, las tensiones étnicas y raciales, las luchas por el agua o por el petróleo, los conflictos originados en el control de zonas estratégicas del mundo, las distintas formas de intervención de la potencia imperial en aquellas regiones del mundo donde se juegan intereses cruciales, todas ellas son parte de la herencia que el siglo XXI ha recibido de la centuria anterior y, en algunos casos, del siglo XIX. El mundo de hoy es tanto o más impredecible que durante el siglo XX. 

Este ensayo tiene por objeto examinar el dilema de la guerra y la paz en la época contemporánea.    

Tres disciplinas nos permiten examinar este tópico: las Relaciones Internacionales, la Teoría Estratégica y la Ciencia Política.  Este trabajo presenta un análisis del sistema internacional, desde la perspectiva intelectual  de la escuela teórica del realismo político y estratégico.   Manuel Luis Rodríguez U.  Cientista Político.

Punta Arenas – Magallanes, invierno de 2006. 

unipolaridad, imperio, incertidumbre y redistribución de las hegemonías: los determinantes estructurales del actual orden mundial

Cuatro conceptos y tendencias profundas permiten comprender el actual estado del sistema internacional: la unipolaridad, un esquema del orden mundial que opera como resultado del término de la guerra fría (1945-1990); la actual hegemonía imperial estadounidense en los planos tecnológico, estratégico y económico; el predominio de un clima internacional caracterizado por la incertidumbre más o menos generalizada o por la pérdida de las certidumbres estratégicas y políticas anteriores; y una tendencia cada vez más marcada hacia la redistribución de las hegemonías a escala planetaria.  El actual orden mundial se comprende a partir de la existencia de un esquema unipolar, es decir, del predominio y hegemonía de una sola potencia sobre el conjunto del sistema-planeta.  Esa potencia unipolar es hoy Estados Unidos.  La hegemonía estadounidense le permite desempeñar en la actualidad una posición de dominación incontestable en el mundo entero, posición que se caracteriza por el ejercicio cada vez más  creciente de una dominación de caracter imperial. Al ordenarse el sistema-planeta en torno a una potencia global, se asume que la forma cómo esa potencia global ejerce su hegemonía es mediante la configuración de relaciones de carácter imperial con las demás potencias mundiales y regionales.  El imperio global es hoy entonces una categoría de análisis que permite entender la forma cómo se encuentra materializada la actual arquitectura internacional y como está distribuido el poder y la dominación en el mundo contemporáneo.  

El imperio ordena el mundo a partir de una jerarquización desigual de las potencias y de una asimetría estratégica estructural básica que el actual « desorden » mundial hereda del anterior sistema internacional. 

El antiguo sistema internacional basado en el paradigma de Westfalia, se encuentra en transición hacia un orden imperial, hacia una Nueva Edad Media postmoderna en que los Estados nacionales son sometidos a una creciente presión « desde abajo » o sea desde las demandas y reivindicaciones regionales y locales, y « desde arriba », o sea desde las emergentes entidades supranacionales y transnacionales que gradualmente le van restando márgenes de soberanía.   De este deterioro del Estado nacional como entidad única y primordial del sistema internacional, también se beneficia la dominación imperial.

El imperio como forma de dominación capitalista global es parte de un proceso estructural mayor del sistema internacional: la redistribución de las hegemonías.  El sistema internacional se distribuye en una jerarquización asimétrica de los actores internacionales.   Esta jerarquización de los actores internacionales, además de las instituciones internacionales y de las organizaciones supranacionales, necesariamente incluye a las potencias globales, potencias mundiales y Estados pivotes continentales, así como potencias regionales y subregionales.

América Latina forma parte de este esquema de redistribución de las hegemonías, en cuanto espacio  geopolítico caracterizado por su desarrollo desigual y dependiente y por su posición periférica dentro del orden global,  y por su condición de espacio geo-económico de interés por los recursos naturales que posee.

los intereses energéticos y los recursos naturales escasos: los determinantes estructurales del conflicto

Las causas fundamentales de las frecuentes guerras que han asolado el mundo desde 1914 en adelante, podrían ser analizadas desde varios puntos de vista.   Aquí se analizan desde la óptica de los intereses energéticos y del control sobre ciertos recursos naturales escasos como el agua o el uranio.

Las guerras del siglo XX y la mayor parte de los actuales focos de conflicto en el mundo se pueden explicar a partir del propósito de determinadas potencias de acceder o asegurarse el control sobre las fuentes de producción y suministro del petróleo.   Desde la década de 1950-1960 en adelante el sistema mundial vive una secuencia de conflictos y guerras originadas en el petróleo.

Guerras por el petróleo en que las potencias mundiales y las grandes corporaciones internacionales occidentales que controlan los puntos de producción se han disputado ya sea directamente (guerra fría entre Estados Unidos y la URSS de 1945 a 1990), o a través de sus Estados aliados (Israel, Arabia Saudita y Jordania como aliados de Estados Unidos; Irak y Egipto como aliadas de la antigua URSS).

Sin embargo, desde el término de la guerra fría (1990) el Medio Oriente ha experimentado un proceso de agudización de las tensiones originadas en el surgimiento de movimientos y grupos islámicos que reivindican el petróleo como propiedad de los Estados árabes donde éste se encuentra, apoyando su demanda en la exacerbación de los sentimientos nacionalistas y de las creencias religiosas dentro del islam.  Cabe subrayar que desde fines del siglo XX, el islam (aún dentro de sus complejas diferencias interiores entre las corrientes chiitas y sunnitas) vive una profunda transformación de orden geopolítico y cultural caracterizada por una toma de conciencia de su potencia energética y por una reafirmación cultural y nacional de su identidad religiosa, como forma de oponerse y resistir a la presencia occidental en sus tierras.

amenazas impredecibles y asimetría: la cambiante naturaleza del conflicto

Ya las guerras no son como antes.

Los conflictos no solo se han vuelto impredecibles, sino que las causas de los conflictos, es decir, en términos estratégicos « la naturaleza de la amenaza » ha cambiado sustancialmente desde los últimos 20 años del siglo XX.  Las guerras del presente no se declaran, se hacen; las guerras se producen por lo tanto en una dimensión de vacío del derecho internacional que impide controlarlas por los procedimientos diplomáticos tradicionales.

Pero además, han evolucionado las causas del conflicto.

En efecto, a las guerras por razones ideológicas, culturales, étnicas y/o religiosas, se agregan los conflictos territoriales y fronterizos, y además, se suman hoy los conflictos económicos y comerciales y la extendida disputa por los recursos naturales escasos (petróleo, gas, uranio y otros metales raros, agua potable…), pero también por el control de recursos naturales no siempre escasos pero de alto valor específico para los Estados involucrados (pesca, dominios marítimos, etc.).

La guerra además, se ha extendido en sus formas específicas de manifestarse, dejando las tradicionales dimensiones terrestre, marítima y aérea, ahora superadas por nuevas modalidades del conflicto bélico como la guerra electrónica, la guerra biológica, química y bacteriológica, además de la guerra nuclear, los conflictos de baja intensidad, la guerra espacial, la guerra por la información o guerra informacional y la guerra ecológica o ambiental.  A estas formas no convencionales del conflicto moderno, deben agregarse también otras combinaciones de la acción estratégica como la guerra aero-terrestre y la guerra submarina.

A la complejización de la amenaza y de las formas del conflicto, se agrega el fenómeno mundial de la proliferación de las armas a toda escala, desde la expansión de los sistemas de producción hasta la implosión de las redes de comercialización abierta y encubierta de armas y sistemas de armas. 

Los nuevos conflictos de hoy y del futuro predecible serán aún más impredecibles, no obstante que los avances tecnológicos en materia de sistemas de vigilancia, control y prevención nos podrían augurar un mundo más controlable y seguro.  No es así.  la proliferación de armas y sistemas de armas, y la complejización de la amenaza determinan por el contrario, que nos internamos en un orden internacional en que la agresión, la amenaza del uso de la fuerza, la provocación o la gesticulación, puede devenir más frecuentes a medida que las instituciones internacionales (Naciones Unidas en primer lugar) sean percibidas como sistemas complejos poco capacitados para prevenirlas o evitarlas.

En un orden mundial como el presente en que la potencia global e imperial solo interviene allí donde sus intereses vitales y estratégicos los perciba amenazados, y donde en consecuencia pueden quedar amplias zonas del mundo -de bajo interés para los Estados Unidos- expuestas a la guerra civil, a los conflictos étnicos, religiosos o geopolíticos y para los cuales la presencia internacional puede llegar a ser tardía e ineficaz, la tentación de cada Estado de armarse para disuadir enemigos reales y potenciales solo puede agudizar las posibilidades de estallidos.

orientaciones bibliográficas

A revolution in warfare. Eliot A. Cohen.  Foreign Affairs. Vol. 75 Nº 2. March/April 1996. N. York, 1996.

America’s Information Edge.  Joseph Nye – William A. Owens. Foreign Affairs, vol. 75 Nº 2.  March/April 1996. N. York, 1996.

Amin, S.: Geopolitique de l’imperialisme contemporain. Paris, 1996. L’Harmattan.

Arm in Arm: The Political Economy of the Global Arms Trade. William W. Keller. N. York, 1995.  Basic Books.

De la guerre.  K. von Clausewitz.  Paris, 1956.  Ed. du Minuit.  (Hay traducciones en español -argentinas, españolas y cubanas- del tratado « De la Guerra » de Karl von Clausewitz, el más destacado estratega teórico del siglo XIX).

Géopolitique.  Les voies de la puissance.  Pierre M. Gallois.  Paris, 1990.  FEDN – Plon.

Glosario de Defensa. M. Sheehan – J. H. Wyllie.  Madrid, 1991.  Ministerio de Defensa de España.

Historia Universal Salvat. 20 vols.  Barcelona, 2006. (Una interesante colección muy actualizada de Historia de la Humanidad, con presentaciones de los distintos continentes y naciones.  Recomendable.)

Historia del siglo XX.  Eric Hobsbawm.  B. Aires, 2001.  Grijalbo-Mondadori. (De los numerosos textos de historia de Eric Hobsbawm, la « Historia del siglo XX » es uno de las mejores síntesis del siglo.  Muy recomendable.)

Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World.  Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi.  Albany, 1995.  State University of New York Press.

L’hegemonie americaine face au multipolarisme emergent.  Saida Bedar.  Le Debat Stratégique N° 72.  Paris, fevrier 2004.  CIRPES.

La conduite de la guerre de 1789 à nos jours. J.F.C. Fuller. Paris, 1963.  Ed. Payot.

Las guerras del futuro. La supervivencia en el alba del siglo XXI.  Alvin Toffler.  Madrid, 1994.  Plaza & Janés Edit.

Powder Kegt in the Middle East: The struggle for Gulf Security. G. Kemp – J. G. Stein.  London, 1995. Rowman & Littlefield 

star wars |
macama |
carotteetdidi |
Unblog.fr | Créer un blog | Annuaire | Signaler un abus | SUIMOI
| Déesse déchue
| Ma Boutique